We investigate the relationship in Bertrand oligopoly between the price effects of mergers absent synergies, and the rates at which merger synergies are passed through to consumers in the form of lower prices. We find that the demand conditions that cause a merger to result in large price increases absent synergies also cause the pass-through rate to be high. We also show that in a leading merger case, the low estimated pass-through rate and the relatively large predicted merger effect most likely were inconsistent.
Introduction
In a static Bertrand oligopoly, we investigate the link between price increases from mergers absent synergies and the pass through to consumers of marginal cost changes associated with merger synergies. Our investigation is motivated by court decisions holding that synergies are relevant to the legality of a merger only to the extent that they are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. In the Staples-Office Depot merger case, for example, the court cited low estimated pass-through rates (15%) as one reason that the claimed efficiencies were insufficient to outweigh the estimated price effects of the merger (Werden, Froeb, and Tschantz [2001] ).
We apply the term "merger effects" to the prices increases from a merger and model them as the difference between the non-cooperative equilibrium in which the merged products are priced independently, and the noncooperative equilibrium in which they are priced jointly. In our terminology, "net" merger effects include impacts of synergies on prices, while "gross" merger effects do not. The differences between net and gross merger effects are the "pass-through effects" of merger synergies. They are modelled as the difference between the post-merger equilibrium without synergies and the post-merger equilibrium with them.
We derive expressions for the net and gross merger effects from the first step of Newton's method, using pre-merger prices as starting values to solve for the post-merger equilibrium. This provides an estimator of merger effects using only information potentially available in the observed pre-merger equilibrium. Examination of this estimator indicates that gross merger effects and pass-through effects are closely related. Both are determined largely by the degree of profit (demand) concavity.
We illustrate how pass-through and gross merger effects depend on demand concavity using data from the proposed merger of WorldCom and Sprint. We further examine the relationship between gross merger effects and pass-through effects in the context of the Staples-Office Depot merger case, in which we find a likely inconsistency between the FTC's price-increase and pass-through predictions.
Merger Effects with Assumed Demand Forms

Merger Effects in Bertrand Industries
Consumers demand quantities given by the vector q = {q i } as a function of the price vector p = {p i }. Product i is supplied at a cost c i which is a function of just q i . Profit from this product is
The price and quantities indexed by i include the merging products as well as competing products with prices that react to changes in merging-product prices.
If each product is controlled by a different firm maximizing the profit from just its product, the first-order conditions for a Nash equilibrium are
where
is the marginal cost of product i. We need not assume that marginal costs are constant, though this is often done in practice. The partial derivative of q i with respect to p j is usually expressed in terms of elasticities:
and the first-order conditions imply
the familiar relation between price-cost margin and own-price demand elasticity.
When several products are controlled by the same firm, the demand interactions among its jointly owned products are internalized. If a single firm controls products 1 and 2, the first-order conditions for that firm are
and
These conditions lead to different equilibrium pricing than equation 2. The difference between these two equilibria is the "unilateral" effect of the merger between sellers of products 1 and 2 in Bertrand oligopoly (Horizontal Merger Guidelines [1992] ).
Computing Gross Merger Effects
To predict gross merger effects in differentiated products industries, economists commonly begin by assuming a particular functional form for demand and estimating demand elasticities. Marginal costs are recovered from the firstorder conditions at the pre-merger equilibrium, e.g., equation (5), and the gross merger effects are computed by solving the first-order conditions, e.g., equations 6 and 7, assuming the same or a different functional form for demand.
The simplest approach for computing merger effects is based on a constantelasticity approximation to an unknown demand curve (e.g., Shapiro [1996] ).
Using an estimate of the elasticity matrix at the pre-merger equilibrium, it is straightforward to compute post-merger prices. The constant-elasticity specification requires no information about non-merging products, as their prices do not change in response to a merger. However, if demand becomes more elastic as price increases, this methodology can dramatically overestimate merger effects (see Crooke et al. [1999] ). As a general matter, an erroneous assumption as to the functional form of demand easily can lead to a very large prediction error. 
These demand curves were constructed to exhibit a constant pass-through rate, θ = ∂p/∂∆mc, where ∆mc is change in marginal cost resulting from merger synergies. By construction, the four demand demand curves share the same price, quantity, and elasticity (−2) at a single point, which we make the competitive equilibrium by assuming a constant marginal cost equal to that price. Figure 1 plots these demand curves between the competitive equilibrium that all four share and the four different monopoly equilibria.
The differing concavity of the four demand curves result in substantially different monopoly prices. The top demand curve, associated with a 200% pass-through rate, yields a monopoly price nearly double that with the bottom demand curve, associated with a 25% pass-through rate. To foreshadow the main result of the paper, demand concavity, which is associated with higher monopoly prices, is also associated with higher pass-through rates.
Newton's Method for Computing
Post-Merger Equilibrium
To compute equilibrium in industries with various ownership structures, we imagine that a single agent controls the pricing of each product but that agent may share in the profits of other products. This simple heuristic allows us to characterize different kinds of equilibria, including a pre-merger equilibrium in which all prices are set independently, and a post-merger equilibrium in which the merged firm maximizes the sum of profits on its jointly owned products.
To make this notion precise, let W = {w ij } specify the ownership structure, where w ij is the share of profit on product j received by the agent setting price on product i, and let agent i maximize
We term the matrix W the "ownership-structure matrix" or simply the "ownership matrix." A pre-merger equilibrium may be represented by W equal to the identity matrix, while a post-merger equilibrium may be represented by a matrix that is the identity except for two off-diagonal entries.
Both scenarios can be represented by the matrix
Setting r = 0 reflects the pre-merger ownership structure, while setting r = 1 reflects the post-merger ownership structure. The formulation of the model in terms of the W matrix also can be used to incorporate partial ownership before or after a merger.
In this general formulation, the first-order conditions are
These first-order conditions apply both pre-and post-merger, using the relevant pre-and post-merger values for the w ij and mc j .
To develop an expression for the net merger effect, we review how one finds a Nash equilibrium satisfying these first-order conditions (10) using Newton's method. Let z i = ∂Ω i /∂p i and let z = {z i } be the vector of these derivatives expressed as functions of p. To solve for simultaneous zeros of the {z i }, we take an initial estimate p (0) and successively refine the estimate
. . , generated by the rule
) is the value of the objective functions at the latest approximation, and A = {a ij }, where
is also evaluated at p (k) . The A matrix is a derivative, and we may write
Newton's method takes a first-order approximation to the z at p (k) ,
and finds the value of p that sets this approximation equal to zero.
To apply Newton's method, it is necessary to specify a initial solution
, and the natural choice in merger analysis is the pre-merger equilibrium.
Taking z (0) to be the first-order conditions evaluated with the post-merger ownership matrix at the pre-merger equilibrium prices, the first step in applying Newton's method is
Solving equation 15 requires evaluation of the second derivatives of q, as they appear in the A matrix. These second derivatives determine the sharpness of the peaks in the merged firm's profit function or, put another way, how much a small deviation from optimal pricing reduces its profits.
Equation (15) yields a closed-form predictor of the net merger effects that incorporates only information potentially available at the observed premerger equilibrium. If the first and second derivatives of q can be measured at the pre-merger equilibrium, e.g., through an econometric procedure, but nothing is known about the functional form of demand function, equation (15) offers the best possible predictor of merger effects. This is the net merger effect, ∆p nme , if the post-merger first-order conditions are evaluated at the marginal costs resulting from merger synergies, i.e., z (0) | mc post :
The gross merger effect, ∆p gme , is equation (15) 3 Pass-Through Rates and Gross Merger Effects
Pass-Through Rates
We now consider how Nash equilibrium pricing is affected by changes in costs (see Bulow and Pleiderer [1983] ; Anderson, De Palma, and Kreider [2000] ).
We assume that merger synergies shift the marginal cost functions for the merged firm's products by ∆mc = {∆mc i }, with ∆mc i independent of q i , i.e., each post-merger cost function equals that pre-merger plus q i ∆mc i .
Thus, we assume the effect of merger synergies on marginal cost is invariant to output, but we do not assume that marginal cost is invariant to output.
We assume the equilibrium p is a continuous and differentiable function
be the matrix of rates at which marginal cost changes affect equilibrium prices, the diagonal entries of which are the rates at which firms pass-through changes in their own marginal costs. Using the implicit function theorem and differentiating the first-order conditions (10) for a post-merger Nash equilibrium, it is straightforward to compute the rate at which changes in marginal cost are passed on to prices. The pass-through-rate matrix is
where B = {b ij } and
Hence, the impact of the marginal cost changes on equilibrium price changes is approximated to the first order by
where the subscript "spt" denotes "synergy pass through." The pass-throughrate matrix (equation 18) indicates the extent to which marginal cost savings from a merger are passed through to consumer prices in the post-merger equilibrium and can be thought of as a predictor of the gross benefits of a merger (under a consumer-welfare standard, which ignores profit increases). The foregoing provides a basis for evaluating the consistency of the 15% firm-specific pass-through rate estimated for the office supply superstore industry by Ashenfelter et al. [1998] in the Staples-Office Depot case, with the estimated industry-wide pass-through rate of 85%. The industry-wide pass-through rate in a symmetric Bertrand industry is simply the sum of the elements of any row in the pass-through matrix. Assuming symmetry and that both estimates were correct, it is simple to infer the off-diagonal, or cross, pass-through rates, from the costs of one firm to the other's price.
In this case, there were either two or three superstores in any particular market. In a two-firm market, the two cross pass-through rates would have to be 70%, and in a three-firm market, they would have to be 35%. In either case, the pass-through matrix would not be positive definite. In the twofirm case, for example, the reaction functions would have slopes of 70/15, and equilibrium would not exist because these reaction functions would not cross.
The pass-through rates also depend on both prices and the ownership structure, W, so pass-through rates in the pre-merger equilibrium differ from those in the post-merger equilibrium. The difference between preand post-merger pass-through rates is most important for the cross pass-through rates of the products of the merging firms. This difference depends on the properties of particular demand systems, and most anything is possible. Cross pass-through rates may be positive pre merger but negative post merger, and they may be positive both pre and post merger but substantially greater pre merger. Since the post-merger equilibrium generally has not been observed at the point mergers are reviewed, post-merger passthrough rates cannot be estimated directly, but rather have to be constructed from the parameters of the firm-level profit functions. If, as in the StaplesOffice Depot case, pass-through rates are estimated, even accurate estimates of pre-merger pass-through rates may prove misleading because the merger causes them to change.
The Relationship Between Pass-Through Rates and Merger Effects
It follows directly from the analysis of the previous section that the net merger effect can be written,
The influence of demand second derivatives, via the A matrix, on both the gross merger effect and the pass-through effect is seen clearly in equation
21. Both terms in the parentheses include only first derivatives, and holding them constant, there is a one-to-one relationship between gross merger effects and pass-through rates. This relationship is manifest in Figure 1 (and in aggregate share into which we place all other firms, thus treating them as a single, price-setting entity in the simulations below. While this imparts an upward bias to the simulated merger effects, it is very small, so that bias can safely be ignored. Professor Hausman's estimated elasticity matrix is presented in Table 1 . The columns relate to prices and the rows relate to quantities, so the figure in the last column of the first row is the elasticity of AT&T's demand with respect to Sprint's price. Three different commonly used demand systems-linear, AIDS (without income effects), and constant elasticity-are calibrated to the same premerger equilibrium, i.e., the same prices, quantities, and elasticities (see Crooke et al. [1999] for calibration details). These merger effects and passthrough rates are illustrated in Table 2 . To illustrate the pass-through effects, we suppose that all of the merger synergies accrue to the Sprint product and examine the pass-through rates for all of the other carriers using the post-merger ownership structure.
The striking feature of Table 2 is the difference across demand systems in predicted gross merger effects and pass-through rates. Both the merger effects and Sprint's own pass-through rate (from Sprint's marginal costs to Sprint's price) for the isoelastic demand are over seven times as large as those for linear demand. Since all demand systems have the same elasticities by construction, the differences across systems are attributed to the different second derivatives.
Compensating Marginal Cost Reductions
Given the difficulty of estimating demand second derivatives, it is discouraging to discover that both merger and pass-through effects depend heavily on them. Fortunately, the marginal cost reductions necessary to keep prices constant (Werden [1996] ) depend only on first derivatives, price, and quantities. These can be computed by setting the term in parentheses in equation 21 to zero, and solving for ∆mc:
These "compensating marginal cost reductions" are robust in that they do not depend on the functional form of demand, but rather only on the demand elasticities, prices, and quantities observed pre merger. That this is the case follows immediately from the fact the matrix B and the vector z (0) contain only first-order terms. Moreover, only the demand elasticities, prices, and quantities of the merging products are relevant. Because prices do not change, the non-merging firms' first-order conditions remain at zero, so the elements of z (0) corresponding to the non-merging firms are zero.
The matrix W, and thus the matrix B, has a block-diagonal form, with the merging products forming a block. Because the inverse of B is also block diagonal, the compensating marginal cost reductions depend only on the elements corresponding to the merging products. Using Professor Hausman's estimated elasticities from the Sprint-WorldCom merger, the compensating marginal cost reductions are 19% for Sprint and 13% for WorldCom, measured as a percentage of their pre-merger marginal costs.
When merger synergies exactly offset the gross merger effects, the passthrough rates can be computed by dividing the gross merger effect, ∆p gme , by the compensating marginal cost reductions, ∆mc comp . Thus, there is a simple relationship between compensating marginal cost reductions, gross merger effects, and merging product demand elasticities.
This relationship allows a useful analysis of pass-through rates that does not depend on second derivatives of demand and hence is not dependent on the functional form of demand. And that analysis allows us to assess the consistency of the estimated pass-through rate 15% in the Staples-Office Depot merger case (Ashenfelter et al. [1998] ) with the predicted price increases in that case of a bit more than 7% (see Werden, Froeb, and Tschantz [2001] ).
This price increase prediction was an average over cities in which the merging firms were the only office supply superstores and cities in which there was a third superstore, which was a weaker competitor than either of the merging firms. We are unable to locate separate price increase predictions for cities with two and three superstores and assume a predicted price increase of 6% for the cities with all three superstores and 7.5% for the cities with just the merging firms.
For two-superstore cities, the implied compensating marginal cost reductions are 50% (7.5%/15%) of price for both merging firms. Since the price-increase and pass-through predictions were the same for both merging firms, we assume they are symmetric in all relevant respects (i.e., prices, quantities, and own and cross elasticities of demand). This symmetry implies the aggregate elasticity of demand for office superstores, , divided by the individual firm own-price elasticity, ii , equals 1 − d, where d is the diversion ratio from one superstore to another, i.e., the quantity one would gain relative to the quantity another would lose, as the latter raised price.
And in Bertrand equilibrium (equation 5) we know that ii = −1/m, where m is the price-marginal cost margin. This symmetry also implies that the compensating marginal cost reduction can be computed as
where, because of the symmetry, d = ij / ii . Thus, in the two-superstore case, a compensating marginal cost reduction of 50% implies d = 1/(1 + 2m) and = −2/(1 + 2m). Given a value for m, d, or , the other two are implied by the price-increase and pass-through predictions.
We suspect that aggregate demand for office supply superstores was rather elastic because there were many alternative sources for office supplies. Since both companies were reporting profits, margins must have been positive, although as discount retailers, we suspect that their margins were rather low. If we are correct in our suspicions, the price-increase prediction likely was inconsistent with the pass-through prediction. For example, if we knew m = 0.3, that would imply = −1.25, which seems unlikely in light of the other sources of office supplies. And if we knew that < −2, there would certainly be a contradiction, since that implies m < 0.
A similar logic applied in the three-superstore case concludes that the implied compensating marginal cost reductions of 40% (6%/15%) of price imply that the superstores have price-cost margins of at least 40%. We find such margins implausibly high for these discount retailers.
Discussion
There is a strong relationship between the costs from a merger-the price increases absent synergies-and the benefits of a merger-the price effects of synergies. Holding constant the first derivatives, i.e., demand elasticities, the rates at which synergies are passed through to consumers in the form of lower prices are high only when the price increases absent synergies are high.
The second derivatives of the profit function play a vital role in determining both gross price effects and pass-through rates, and our predictor of the net merger effect presented in equation (16) is crucially dependent on them. To ensure consistency between predicted price effects and pass-through effects, they can be jointly estimated by our predictor.
In applied work, it is desirable to use functional forms that do not impose demand second derivative but rather allow them to be estimated. Mixed logit models (McFadden and Train [1999] and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [1995] ), in which the mixing distribution is determined empirically, seem promising because the empirical distribution of customer types can determine the curvature of demand to a significant extent.
As an alternative to estimating demand second derivatives, one can compute the compensating marginal cost reductions necessary to offset the merger price effects. These depend only on the first derivatives of demand.
By comparing likely cost reductions with these compensating marginal cost reductions, it generally is possible to determine whether prices are likely to rise or fall, which appears to be the critical issue under current antitrust law. We do not, however, endorse the consumer-welfare standard in current law. Rather, we merely present a rigorous methodology for implementing the policy that the courts have adopted.
